Least favorite philosopher?

[dgswaim]

Just out of curiosity, why is there such a strong tendency toward disliking continental thinkers here?

[bar_scene_gambler]

Just out of curiosity, why is there such a strong tendency toward disliking continental thinkers here?

By here do you mean the entirety of the philosophical world, excepting some small pockets in the English-speaking world and Europe, or do you mean The Grad Cafe?

[ianfaircloud]

Just out of curiosity, why is there such a strong tendency toward disliking continental thinkers here?

 

Great, great question.  This merits a thread of its own.  If you accept the continental-analytic distinction, then depending on whom you place in the category of continental, you may believe that the writing of continental philosophers tends to be less rigorous.  Before someone launches into criticism, note that these people are *not* saying that continental philosophers are less intelligent, that the content of their work isn't as profound, that they are less capable, that they're not doing philosophy, etc.  Many of those who are labeled 'continental' simply aren't writing in the style of contemporary analytic philosophy-- a style that places certain demands on the writer.  So it's *not* a criticism of continental philosophers that the writing is less rigorous.  Also the generalization admits of exceptions.  That why I use the words 'tend', 'many of', etc.  It's a general observation based on limited experience.

Edited February 13, 2014 by ianfaircloud

[dgswaim]

By here do you mean the entirety of the philosophical world, excepting some small pockets in the English-speaking world and Europe, or do you mean The Grad Cafe?

I meant the Grad Cafe philosophy forum.

[dgswaim]

Great, great question.  This merits a thread of its own.  If you accept the continental-analytic distinction, then depending on whom you place in the category of continental, you may believe that the writing of continental philosophers tends to be less rigorous.  Before someone launches into criticism, note that these people are *not* saying that continental philosophers are less intelligent, that the content of their work isn't as profound, that they are less capable, that they're not doing philosophy, etc.  Many of those who are labeled 'continental' simply aren't writing in the style of contemporary analytic philosophy-- a style that places certain demands on the writer.  So it's *not* a criticism of continental philosophers that the writing is less rigorous.  Also the generalization admits of exceptions.  That why I use the words 'tend', 'many of', etc.  It's a general observation based on limited experience.

I don't accept the distinction, personally. I think good philosophy is good philosophy. With respect to rigor, I think the some of the most detailed and rigorously articulated philosophy in recent decades has come out of the continental tradition. Paul Ricouer, for instance, is usually thought of as a prominent figure in contemporary continental european thought, but he is conversant with the work of the Vienna Circle, 20th century analytic epistemology, Bertrand Russell, A.N. Whitehead, etc. His three-volume work "Time and Narrative" alone speaks to his erudition. I suppose I am of the opinion that philosophy is best done in this spirit. Both "traditions" have made (and continue to make) meaningful contributions to philosophy. While I lean analytic, I take good work where I find it. Husserl and Gadamer are no slouches either. Levinas is brilliant. I guess I just don't see the meaning in the "divide."

[ianfaircloud]

I don't accept the distinction, personally. I think good philosophy is good philosophy. With respect to rigor, I think the some of the most detailed and rigorously articulated philosophy in recent decades has come out of the continental tradition. Paul Ricouer, for instance, is usually thought of as a prominent figure in contemporary continental european thought, but he is conversant with the work of the Vienna Circle, 20th century analytic epistemology, Bertrand Russell, A.N. Whitehead, etc. His three-volume work "Time and Narrative" alone speaks to his erudition. I suppose I am of the opinion that philosophy is best done in this spirit. Both "traditions" have made (and continue to make) meaningful contributions to philosophy. While I lean analytic, I take good work where I find it. Husserl and Gadamer are no slouches either. Levinas is brilliant. I guess I just don't see the meaning in the "divide."

 

I think these are fine examples, and they deserve attention as exceptions to what I've seen as a rule, regarding rigor.  But do you see meaning in the divide in terms of style?  Surely you do.  To me, there's just no question that there's a stylistic difference that roughly divides modern philosophy into two.  Perhaps my point about rigor is more controversial.  But I'm pretty confident that there's a meaningful stylistic difference.  Do you agree on that point?

[SelfHatingPhilosopher]

I'm a party-line partisan analytic. I don't see any meaning in the distinction, but only because I don't find any overlap between continental and analytic philosophy and just treat continental as a different discipline like English or Anthropology.

[SelfHatingPhilosopher]

I don't accept the distinction, personally. I think good philosophy is good philosophy. With respect to rigor, I think the some of the most detailed and rigorously articulated philosophy in recent decades has come out of the continental tradition. Paul Ricouer, for instance, is usually thought of as a prominent figure in contemporary continental european thought, but he is conversant with the work of the Vienna Circle, 20th century analytic epistemology, Bertrand Russell, A.N. Whitehead, etc. His three-volume work "Time and Narrative" alone speaks to his erudition. I suppose I am of the opinion that philosophy is best done in this spirit. Both "traditions" have made (and continue to make) meaningful contributions to philosophy. While I lean analytic, I take good work where I find it. Husserl and Gadamer are no slouches either. Levinas is brilliant. I guess I just don't see the meaning in the "divide."

 

Also your examples of paragons of rigor makes clear to me that we mean different things by the word "rigor"

[ianfaircloud]

I'm a party-line partisan analytic. I don't see any meaning in the distinction, but only because I don't find any overlap between continental and analytic philosophy and just treat continental as a different discipline like English or Anthropology.

 

I do treat continental as a different discipline for the most part.  I draw on the work of continental philosophers, just as I often draw on the work of psychologists, sociologists, historians, etc., though perhaps to a different extent.

[Monadology]

I'm a party-line partisan analytic. I don't see any meaning in the distinction, but only because I don't find any overlap between continental and analytic philosophy and just treat continental as a different discipline like English or Anthropology.

 

If you don't find any overlap, you're clearly not paying attention. At this point there has been plenty of work showing just how much overlap there is in each tradition (Lee Brave is an excellent example).

 

I also think there may be some meaning to a stylistic distinction, but I don't think it has to do with rigor and I don't think it has to do with clarity either. Analytic philosophy is as capable of being just as obtuse to the uninitiated as continental philosophy.

 

EDIT: And there are plenty of big-names in the analytic tradition that are obtuse even to the initiated: Davidson, Frege, Michael Thompson, Wittgenstein, Anscombe, McDowell. Judging philosophy done in France or Germany by the style of Derrida is the equivalent of judging philosophy done in the States by the style of Michael Thompson. 

Edited February 13, 2014 by Monadology

[dgswaim]

I think these are fine examples, and they deserve attention as exceptions to what I've seen as a rule, regarding rigor.  But do you see meaning in the divide in terms of style?  Surely you do.  To me, there's just no question that there's a stylistic difference that roughly divides modern philosophy into two.  Perhaps my point about rigor is more controversial.  But I'm pretty confident that there's a meaningful stylistic difference.  Do you agree on that point?

Yes. Broadly speaking I would tend to agree that there are stylistic differences. But I see no reason why this should mean that analytic philosophy should ignore the contributions of the continental tradition, and vise versa. I think the continental tradition has much to learn (in terms of writing, especially) from the Anglo-analytic school. Continentals could stand to use more formal logic and to write more clearly in general. But analytic types should be open to the broad conceptual analysis entertained by continentals in their explorations of various approaches to the construction of meaning in the humanistic tradition, and also they should recognize the limitations of logic and language (etc. etc.). I recognize that there are differences, but I find (generally) that these differences should be embraced. To deny overlap is just to view philosophy so narrowly that it is hardly philosophy anymore. 

[dgswaim]

Also your examples of paragons of rigor makes clear to me that we mean different things by the word "rigor"

If this is to imply that someone like Ricouer lacks rigor in his work generally, then I would have to question whether you've actually read his work. If you mean that the kind of rigor seemingly manifest in his work is qualitatively different than the kind manifest in whatever analytic thinker you uphold as exemplary, then you might be right. But so what? I see no reason why analytic philosophy... whatever that means... fully exhausts the proper definition of philosophy (and I say this as one working primarily in the analytic tradition, as has been mentioned).

[Monadology]

If this is to imply that someone like Ricouer lacks rigor in his work generally, then I would have to question whether you've actually read his work. If you mean that the kind of rigor seemingly manifest in his work is qualitatively different than the kind manifest in whatever analytic thinker you uphold as exemplary, then you might be right. But so what? I see no reason why analytic philosophy... whatever that means... fully exhausts the proper definition of philosophy (and I say this as one working primarily in the analytic tradition, as has been mentioned).

 

Similarly, if Husserl is lacking in rigor I'm really not sure what the word is supposed to mean then.

[dgswaim]

Similarly, if Husserl is lacking in rigor I'm really not sure what the word is supposed to mean then.

Husserl on the natural sciences. Husserl on the humanities. Husserl on mathematical concepts. Talk about a capacious mind. I wish I could do philosophy the way he did philosophy.

[SelfHatingPhilosopher]

If you don't find any overlap, you're clearly not paying attention. At this point there has been plenty of work showing just how much overlap there is in each tradition (Lee Brave is an excellent example).

 

Really? I'm curious then.

 

If I'm doing phil science, and I'm wondering about resultant and component forces, and I'm reading Creary, Cartwright, and Wilson, I'm wondering what continental philosophy has to offer.

If I'm doing meta-ethics, and I'm trying to provide a formal semantics for expressivism in light of Being For, I'm wondering what continental philosophy has to offer.

If I'm doing metaphysics, and I'm trying to defend Boolos' account of plural quantification in second-order logic, I'm wondering what continental philosophy has to offer.

If I'm doing political philosophy, and I'm trying to give an argument against Cohen's account of societal development as a functional argument revolving around a society's productive relations, I'm wondering what continental philosophy has to offer.

 

Because obviously they've made no actual contribution to these problems, but I also don't see how they ever could, or how anything they've said thus far could be relevant.

[Monadology]

So let me get this straight: you claim their is no overlap between continental and analytic philosophy. Your evidence for this is to pick parochial, highly specific (and technical) issues in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy and then point out that no continental philosophers have made contributions to those issues?

 

Are you serious? That's not the only level of meaningful overlap, first of all. Second of all, it's disingenuous to expect the person you're talking to to be familiar enough with four technical and highly specific problems in philosophy to the extent that they could provide a refutation in all four cases (as a matter of fact, I am familiar with none of them because you picked topics in four of the areas of philosophy I am least interested in). 

 

But here, I can point out to some more general overlap just off the top of my head:

 

As mentioned above, Lee Braver has written a book on how continental figures fit into the realism/anti-realism debate.

Philosophy of language (Habermas, Derrida, Deleuze, Heidegger, structuralism)

Philosophy of science (Deleuze, Foucalt, Bergson, Michael Polanyi, Catherine Malabou, Ernst Cassirer)

Epistemology (Any phenomenologist, Michael Polanyi, Foucalt, Cassirer, Gadamer)

Metaethics (Nietzsche, Deleuze, Derrida, Levinas, Sartre)

Metaphysics (Heidegger, Deleuze, Bergson, Badiou, Tristan Garcia, phenomenology depending on one's interpretation of it)

Ethics (Levinas, Derrida, Habermas, Sartre, Adorno, Arendt)

Political Philosophy (Habermas, Marx, Agamben, Derrida, Deleuze, Foucalt, Arendt, Adorno)

 

Now, if you want to find the relevance of Continental philosophy for particular issues within those fields you're going to need to actually read the continental philosophy or read people doing work on that very subject (some examples: Lee Braver, Hubert Dreyfus, Ray Brassier, Paul Katsafanas, Paul Livingston, Samuel Wheeler, Adrian Moore, Graham Priest). Sometimes the relevance will be oblique, sometimes more direct, and sometimes you won't be able to find any. Obviously you might not find it worth your while and would rather stick to analytic philosophy, since you'll have to do a lot of reading of unfamiliar authors. That's fair. But the claim that there is no overlap is just false.

Edited February 13, 2014 by Monadology

[maxhgns]

Nicely threadjacked, everyone.

[ianfaircloud]

Nicely threadjacked, everyone.

 

Hahaha!  That's a great term: threadjacked.  

[dgswaim]

So let me get this straight: you claim their is no overlap between continental and analytic philosophy. Your evidence for this is to pick parochial, highly specific (and technical) issues in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy and then point out that no continental philosophers have made contributions to those issues?

 

Are you serious? That's not the only level of meaningful overlap, first of all. Second of all, it's disingenuous to expect the person you're talking to to be familiar enough with four technical and highly specific problems in philosophy to the extent that they could provide a refutation in all four cases (as a matter of fact, I am familiar with none of them because you picked topics in four of the areas of philosophy I am least interested in). 

 

But here, I can point out to some more general overlap just off the top of my head:

 

As mentioned above, Lee Braver has written a book on how continental figures fit into the realism/anti-realism debate.

Philosophy of language (Habermas, Derrida, Deleuze, Heidegger, structuralism)

Philosophy of science (Deleuze, Foucalt, Bergson, Michael Polanyi, Catherine Malabou, Ernst Cassirer)

Epistemology (Any phenomenologist, Michael Polanyi, Foucalt, Cassirer, Gadamer)

Metaethics (Nietzsche, Deleuze, Derrida, Levinas, Sartre)

Metaphysics (Heidegger, Deleuze, Bergson, Badiou, Tristan Garcia, phenomenology depending on one's interpretation of it)

Ethics (Levinas, Derrida, Habermas, Sartre, Adorno, Arendt)

Political Philosophy (Habermas, Marx, Agamben, Derrida, Deleuze, Foucalt, Arendt, Adorno)

 

Now, if you want to find the relevance of Continental philosophy for particular issues within those fields you're going to need to actually read the continental philosophy or read people doing work on that very subject (some examples: Lee Braver, Hubert Dreyfus, Ray Brassier, Paul Katsafanas, Paul Livingston, Samuel Wheeler, Adrian Moore, Graham Priest). Sometimes the relevance will be oblique, sometimes more direct, and sometimes you won't be able to find any. Obviously you might not find it worth your while and would rather stick to analytic philosophy, since you'll have to do a lot of reading of unfamiliar authors. That's fair. But the claim that there is no overlap is just false.

I like the Malabou shout out. She's probably my favorite contemporary interlocutor on Hegel.

[SelfHatingPhilosopher]

So let me get this straight: you claim their is no overlap between continental and analytic philosophy. Your evidence for this is to pick parochial, highly specific (and technical) issues in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy and then point out that no continental philosophers have made contributions to those issues?

 

Are you serious? That's not the only level of meaningful overlap, first of all. Second of all, it's disingenuous to expect the person you're talking to to be familiar enough with four technical and highly specific problems in philosophy to the extent that they could provide a refutation in all four cases (as a matter of fact, I am familiar with none of them because you picked topics in four of the areas of philosophy I am least interested in). 

 

But here, I can point out to some more general overlap just off the top of my head:

 

As mentioned above, Lee Braver has written a book on how continental figures fit into the realism/anti-realism debate.

Philosophy of language (Habermas, Derrida, Deleuze, Heidegger, structuralism)

Philosophy of science (Deleuze, Foucalt, Bergson, Michael Polanyi, Catherine Malabou, Ernst Cassirer)

Epistemology (Any phenomenologist, Michael Polanyi, Foucalt, Cassirer, Gadamer)

Metaethics (Nietzsche, Deleuze, Derrida, Levinas, Sartre)

Metaphysics (Heidegger, Deleuze, Bergson, Badiou, Tristan Garcia, phenomenology depending on one's interpretation of it)

Ethics (Levinas, Derrida, Habermas, Sartre, Adorno, Arendt)

Political Philosophy (Habermas, Marx, Agamben, Derrida, Deleuze, Foucalt, Arendt, Adorno)

 

Now, if you want to find the relevance of Continental philosophy for particular issues within those fields you're going to need to actually read the continental philosophy or read people doing work on that very subject (some examples: Lee Braver, Hubert Dreyfus, Ray Brassier, Paul Katsafanas, Paul Livingston, Samuel Wheeler, Adrian Moore, Graham Priest). Sometimes the relevance will be oblique, sometimes more direct, and sometimes you won't be able to find any. Obviously you might not find it worth your while and would rather stick to analytic philosophy, since you'll have to do a lot of reading of unfamiliar authors. That's fair. But the claim that there is no overlap is just false.

 

 

I'd actually say it's the only meaningful overlap. Analytic philosophy is a science and deals with a narrow, technical focus. I could iterate through countless of other deabtes, and the result would be the same. Marx, Habermas, Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, Adorno... none of them have anything to say that will be useful beyond a very trivial sense because it's not grounded in anything nor is it technically developed.

 

I 've read a good bit of continental because I used to specialize in it. I've probably read more Hegel, Marx, Adorno, Sartre, and commentators than I have analytic philosophy; and yet, it's all been useless in any sort of metaphysics or political philosophy work that I've done thus far.

Edited February 13, 2014 by SelfHatingPhilosopher

[Monadology]

I created a separate thread to continue this discussion. 

 

EDIT: And I have now posted a response to your most recent post in that thread.

Edited February 13, 2014 by Monadology