Math Skills Survey for this year's applicants

[RWBG]

I would agree with coach that people shouldn't get overly fixated on/worried about math. After all, this isn't economics (where math signals are much more heavily emphasized.) In fact, NYU, one of the most mathy programs, has this to say to applicants:

"We have no set minimum math background. But we have a very analytical program, the more math you know, the better off you are. If you have not had calculus or statistics (recently!), we will suggest you do some work over the summer prior to matriculation if we offer you admission. [since we do make such suggestions - you should assume that not knowing how to take a derivative would not disqualify you from admission.] And if you are reading this early enough -- take a math course your senior year. "

That being said, I wouldn't want people to be discouraged from taking math classes either. I'm not a great mathematician, but I found the math stuff I've studied pretty useful. And while math is certainly not a sufficient signal to get you into grad school in political science, when you're looking for any signals you can get, I can't imagine it can hurt!

Also, for what it's worth, I don't think things have degenerated into a "urinating contest." Veracious-star is head and shoulders above everyone else here in terms of math preparation, but has been remarkably and commendably humble about it.

Veracious-star: I just noticed your post on mechanism design, and I can't say I know enough about it to comment. From what little I know, as I understand it, mechanism design involves a strategic interaction where one of the players determines the payoff structure. Does "working backwards from equilibrium" mean they find the equilibrium in any payoff matrix they would propose, and then use backwards induction based on the outcome when choosing which payoff matrix/"mechanism" to propose? If this is what that means, I imagine there would be a lot of cool applications, though I imagine its applicability would depend on the structure of the situation in question.

Edited February 8, 2011 by RWBG

[catchermiscount]

Oh, I did not mean to say that this was a urinating contest per se---in fact, as you noted, it's been relatively collegial by the standards of these conversations. Still, it takes but a single drop of pee to turn a nice session of Kumbaya into Peefest 2011, as these things often do.

[Charlie2010]

Most serious applicants at top-ten programs have taken at least one college level math course and one stats or methods course. Beyond that, math training is just one of a variety of ways that one can distinguish oneself. And the occasional star with no calculus gets in, but you're better off taking a couple of courses than hoping you're good enough to be that person.

[veracious_star]

@Coachrjc

Sorry if I offended anyone or came off overly competitive. Mostly, I was just sharing my apprehensions during this process of applying and any advice that I have. I hope that everyone feels comfortable to share their opinions in this forum.

I had never heard of a "urinating contest" before...perhaps thats because I'm female or maybe just out of it...but it was a little mean to denigrate our conversation like that. We are definitely all mature enough to keep the conversation respectful and engaging.

The very fact that we are discussing this is one of the things that bugs me a little bit about pol sci forums...often everything becomes a zero-sum game....either qualitative or quantitative...there is no room for both...we are all trying to feel better about our own preparation....however I think diversity is what makes pol sci better than economics is that there are a variety of approaches to answering political questions. (PS. Diversity is awesome...and zero-sum games always have a worse payoff for players than cooperative games in equilibrium-- hence there is a definite benefit to Kumbaya!!!).

Every approach has it's own unique difficulties and strengths. Formulating good case studies to persuasively prove a general theory is ridiculously difficult thats why there are so few Theda Skocpols, Seymour Lipsets, Huntingtons, etc...There will always be a place for insightful, indepth qualitative analysis in political science. Saying that, I feel that some political scientists disregard mathematical approaches to understanding political actors and institutions and they sideline the conclusions of formal models and quantitative methods. I did my undergrad at a well-known school in pol sci and I often felt that quantitative approaches to understanding political phenomenon were ignored or marginalized. This should not happen either...there are merits to all aproaches and I hope that political sicentists in the future are better at integrating.

@RWBG

My understanding of mechanism design is quite meager as well, but I think its useful because often there are real world observations...so we see the equilibrium or we have a social optimal equilibirum...like coalition government with X policy for good provision....or Y dollars in campaign finance to candidate C...so how do you reach this equilibrium?...then they essentially work backwards with the consideration that players can make their own rules.... i.e. develop the rule structure that is optimal for a given player and figure out the earlier behavior of other players so that it is rational to reach this equilibrium...it would be interesting to study this in relation to the formation of states....it seems like a really exciting take on traditional game theory and really applicable to pol sci...I wish I could take a class in it...

[RWBG]

@Coachrjc

Sorry if I offended anyone or came off overly competitive. Mostly, I was just sharing my apprehensions during this process of applying and any advice that I have. I hope that everyone feels comfortable to share their opinions in this forum.

I had never heard of a "urinating contest" before...perhaps thats because I'm female or maybe just out of it...but it was a little mean to denigrate our conversation like that. We are definitely all mature enough to keep the conversation respectful and engaging.

...

@RWBG

My understanding of mechanism design is quite meager as well, but I think its useful because often there are real world observations...so we see the equilibrium or we have a social optimal equilibirum...like coalition government with X policy for good provision....or Y dollars in campaign finance to candidate C...so how do you reach this equilibrium?...then they essentially work backwards with the consideration that players can make their own rules.... i.e. develop the rule structure that is optimal for a given player and figure out the earlier behavior of other players so that it is rational to reach this equilibrium...it would be interesting to study this in relation to the formation of states....it seems like a really exciting take on traditional game theory and really applicable to pol sci...I wish I could take a class in it...

I think the more commonly used term is "pissing contest," haha. But I don't think coach was trying to say that the conversation had degenerated into one, but more so cautioning that a topic like this can head in that direction. So I wouldn't take it as a slight on the conversation so far; once again, I should emphasize that you haven't come across as overly competitive.

As far as mechanism design, it had been my impression that a lot of microeconomic theory constructs models "backwards" from empirical observation/data (or at least purports to), so I don't know if that's what distinguishes mechanism design. Maybe I'm misunderstanding your point/misunderstanding mechanism design?

[Charlie2010]

Actually, mechanism design tends to be non-contextual, starting from first principles. Definitely not starting from actual institutions that exist in the real world. Although the best articles (or most famous) tend to show why real-world institutions actually serve certain functions. (yes, very functionalist)

[veracious_star]

Actually, mechanism design tends to be non-contextual, starting from first principles. Definitely not starting from actual institutions that exist in the real world. Although the best articles (or most famous) tend to show why real-world institutions actually serve certain functions. (yes, very functionalist)

Yeah, I see what you mean....I did not mean to imply that it was based on empirical reality...what pol economy articles really model institutions that exist?--you have to make elementary assumptions and lower complexity of the game or it becomes impossible for anyone to solve-- even a computer. Plus, that's probably what actual political actors do...Again, I've never taken a class in mech design and i'm not an economics student...but there seems to be a great deal of articles on mechanism design related to good provision, media/corportate funding, and, of course, in economics on auctions..... I guess I was suggesting that it can be used to model the formation of the state...though it hasn't really been used for that before....because the basic mathematically constructs for mechanism design fit well with the basic assumptions for formation of the state---essentially multiple player game (mutiple interest groups), Bayesian game (incomplete info), finite, and perhaps one player has the ability to structure the institutions of the state to procure their desired outcome....Here's how I think of mechanism design (i'm coming from a game theory perspective)....but i'm always interested to learn more...or for you to correct my wrong assumptions....

Essentially in game theory, there are solution concepts or rules for how to chose an optimum strategy given what the other players do. The most well known solution concept is the Nash Equilibirum (NE) concept. To have a NE, there has to be assumptions for rules, structure, payoffs to a game....... Since there can be multiple equilibria in a game which statisfies Nash Equilibirum requirement, so there is pure nash, mixed nash, Subgame Perfect Nash, Evolutionary Stable, Perfect...and the list goes on....In traditional game theory, backward induction gives you the Subgame Perfect equilibria. (So there is a equilibria which can be found by pure backward induction)....essentially the brilliance of mechanism design is that it opens the constraints of the game....so it gives players the ability to structure the rules, .i.e perhaps the number of rounds/incentive structure/etc, knowing their desired outcome/payoff, given the fact that they do not have a great deal of information about their opponent (only distribution of types). It allows you to study the optimal institutional framework (incentive structure) that leads to their preferred outcome...

--I think there are more applications of mech design in pol sci, than in economics which it was originally created for....either way it is an exciting new way to look at the world...and i see more micro political economy papers structured this way....

--this conversation is making me worried about my chances at a political science Phd (this is kinda what I talked about it my SOP) .....

[Penelope Higgins]

If you're interested in applying these ideas to state formation, you should see Yoram Barzel's work on the state, and Steven Haber's 'The Politics of Property Rights' and Robert Bates and James Robinson also have some relevant papers.

auctions..... I guess I was suggesting that it can be used to model the formation of the state...though it hasn't really been used for that before....because the basic mathematically constructs for mechanism design fit well with the basic assumptions for formation of the state---essentially multiple player game (mutiple interest groups), Bayesian game (incomplete info), finite, and perhaps one player has the ability to structure the institutions of the state to procure their desired outcome....Here's how I think of mechanism design (i'm coming from a game theory perspective)....but i'm always interested to learn more...or for you to correct my wrong assumptions....

[veracious_star]

If you're interested in applying these ideas to state formation, you should see Yoram Barzel's work on the state, and Steven Haber's 'The Politics of Property Rights' and Robert Bates and James Robinson also have some relevant papers.

Thanks for the suggestions !!!!!

[wannabee]

My quant background was the weaker part of my application. I am in comparative and my undergrad degree was in area studies. My gpa, language preparation, and references are fairly strong, but I only took college statistics and before that AP calculus. My verbal GRE is much higher (99%) than my quant (66%). I have not taken econ.

I've just heard back from Maryland and was admitted with funding. This is the most quant oriented program that I applied to. I am thinking that I should spend next summer before grad school strengthening my econ and/or quant to make my required methods courses a little easier. Perhaps econ at the local community college? I have also noticed that MIT has an online graduate level course: Quantitative Research in Political Science and Public Policy taught by Prof. Stephen Ansolabehere.

http://ocw.mit.edu/c...cy-spring-2004/

Would this help?

I will hopefully be returning to Cairo next week to focus on language and finish my program, but will be home at the end of May for the summer. Any suggestions or ideas?

Edited February 13, 2011 by wannabee