Continental/Analytic Differences, Similarities and Overlap

[Monadology]

As a poster pointed out, the thread about least favorite philosophers was hijacked by some of us to talk about the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy.

 

As penance and reparation, I've made a separate thread to discuss that topic.

[Monadology]

 

I'd actually say it's the only meaningful overlap. Analytic philosophy is a science and deals with a narrow, technical focus. I could iterate through countless of other deabtes, and the result would be the same. Marx, Habermas, Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, Adorno... none of them have anything to say that will be useful beyond a very trivial sense because it's not grounded in anything nor is it technically developed.

I listed several authors who have written precisely on how continental authors are relevant to analytic debates. Maybe you just didn't look into any of them. Here are some examples with further details:

 

Paul Katsafanas has a book (Agency and the Foundations of Ethics) out on Nietzsche's relevance to ongoing debates about constitutivism in agency/metaethics. 

Lee Braver has a book (A Thing of This World) on the relevance of continental figures such as Heidegger and Foucalt to the realism/anti-realism debate.

Graham Priest in Beyond the Limits of Thought shows how Derrida and Heidegger are relevant to paraconsistency and semantic paradox.

Samuel Wheeler has a book (Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy) connecting Derrida to issues in analytic philosophy of language.

In his book Heidegger's Analytic, Taylor Carman connects Heidegger to contemporary debates about semantic externalism.

 

By the way, Adrian Moore's book The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics, places thinkers in the continental tradition in a narrative of the development of contemporary metaphysics. That might be of most interest to you (though I doubt you'll take an interest, you seem dismissive of the possibility of overlap). Also Kris McDaniel is a contemporary analytic metaphysician (who does technical work in the field) with an interest in Heidegger.

Edited February 13, 2014 by Monadology

[dgswaim]

Surely some of the recent work by Richard Rorty makes clear the connection between analytic and continental thought in phil science.

[dgswaim]

Also, Terry Pinkard takes what I would classify as a largely analytic approach in his work on Hegel, focusing more on what Hegel's contributions to contemporary epistemology might be as opposed to Hegel as systematician/metaphysician. 

Edited February 13, 2014 by dgswaim

[Monadology]

Thanks! I'm not familiar with Pinkard and I didn't think of Rorty.

[dgswaim]

Pinkard is a professor at Georgetown... so maybe you'll get a chance to get to know him!

[maxhgns]

I don't really have a horse in this fight (I did my UG in history/continental, but have moved into the analytic camp since my MA), but I'll say a couple small things.

 

First, I think that SHP put her point too strongly in her last post: at the very least, Marx and Foucault have (had) things to say that are more than trivially useful (even to analytically oriented political philosophers), and aren't just obscurantist BS. I can't really speak to the others on the list, never having read them (save Derrida in an UG course on literary theory, and I thought he was full of it).

 

Second (here comes some nitpicky pedantry): I don't think it's at all right or fair to characterize analytic philosophy as a science. It may perhaps aspire to have that status, but it's still philosophy: the bulk of its subject matter can't be empirically investigated, and there's not much to be had by way of falsifiability either. The methodology is not insignificantly different, either.

 

Third, while I do think that there are useful areas of overlap, I don't think they're quite as broad as was suggested by Monadology in the other thread. Frankly, I don't think that Heidegger (for example) has much to offer metaphysics--certainly not contemporary metaphysics. And I'm similarly unconvinced about the figures listed for metaethics and epistemology. But that doesn't mean that their work is worthless (although in some cases, I'm tempted to say it is), or that their methodology is useless. It's just a fact about those figures and their ideas not fitting well with the state of those subdisciplines.

 

One thing that worries me (just a nagging worry, not an existential one) is the role we ascribe to the history of our discipline (and historical figures). One thing I've noticed, over the course of my education and subdisciplinary transition, is that "continental" philosophy seems to have a much closer relationship to (or even a claim over) the history of philosophy (particularly since Spinoza/Kant). I guess it worries me because I have a hard time disentangling the historical and contemporary components when I mix with "continentalists". How much of what they say/write is intended as historical scholarship, and how much is a substantive claim about some (non-historical) subject? To the extent that it's the former, I don't worry at all (except insofar as I'm uncertain what role I think the discipline should accord to history). To the extent that it's the latter, I worry because that seems like precisely the extent to which one should be conversant with contemporary work that's done in both traditions.

[dgswaim]

I don't really have a horse in this fight (I did my UG in history/continental, but have moved into the analytic camp since my MA), but I'll say a couple small things.

 

First, I think that SHP put her point too strongly in her last post: at the very least, Marx and Foucault have (had) things to say that are more than trivially useful (even to analytically oriented political philosophers), and aren't just obscurantist BS. I can't really speak to the others on the list, never having read them (save Derrida in an UG course on literary theory, and I thought he was full of it).

 

Second (here comes some nitpicky pedantry): I don't think it's at all right or fair to characterize analytic philosophy as a science. It may perhaps aspire to have that status, but it's still philosophy: the bulk of its subject matter can't be empirically investigated, and there's not much to be had by way of falsifiability either. The methodology is not insignificantly different, either.

 

Third, while I do think that there are useful areas of overlap, I don't think they're quite as broad as was suggested by Monadology in the other thread. Frankly, I don't think that Heidegger (for example) has much to offer metaphysics--certainly not contemporary metaphysics. And I'm similarly unconvinced about the figures listed for metaethics and epistemology. But that doesn't mean that their work is worthless (although in some cases, I'm tempted to say it is), or that their methodology is useless. It's just a fact about those figures and their ideas not fitting well with the state of those subdisciplines.

 

One thing that worries me (just a nagging worry, not an existential one) is the role we ascribe to the history of our discipline (and historical figures). One thing I've noticed, over the course of my education and subdisciplinary transition, is that "continental" philosophy seems to have a much closer relationship to (or even a claim over) the history of philosophy (particularly since Spinoza/Kant). I guess it worries me because I have a hard time disentangling the historical and contemporary components when I mix with "continentalists". How much of what they say/write is intended as historical scholarship, and how much is a substantive claim about some (non-historical) subject? To the extent that it's the former, I don't worry at all (except insofar as I'm uncertain what role I think the discipline should accord to history). To the extent that it's the latter, I worry because that seems like precisely the extent to which one should be conversant with contemporary work that's done in both traditions.

I think you might be right about Heidegger, though I think that I think you're right for different reasons than you probably intended. I agree that Heidegger is not terribly useful to contemporary analytic metaphysics, but that's mostly because I don't think that his work is really particularly metaphysical in character. His work is not an examination of the deep structure of reality in the same way that someone like Peter Van Inwagen, for instance, studies the deep nature (which is to say, an articulation of the properties of matter, etc.). Heidegger, as I interpret him (I am no expert in his work, mind you) is primarily doing hermeneutics (picking up on the work of Hegel and Husserl), but primarily through the lens of a certain kind of formal ontology. Heidegger is exploring the nature of reality as it is expressed through the relations of consciousness (i.e. he is trying to formally articulate the way in which the world becomes meaningful to humans). Given my reading of Heidegger, I see his project as primarily epistemological.

 

As for Derrida... some of his earlier work is ok. "Glas" is a mess. His "debate" with Gadamer was embarrassing. But there's some good philosophy in "writing and Difference." "Of Grammatology" is ok. I don't think, however, that Derrida's work is all that useful to analytic types. And boy do the pure analytics hate his guts...

[Monadology]

[Heidegger is my stand-in philosopher here and metaphysics my stand-in analytic subdiscipline, but it's an arbitrary choice so don't read too much into it]

 

I'm a little surprised at how the issue of overlap is being approached in terms of usefulness. SHP framed it that way ("How could I make use of Heidegger in an argument for X") as did maxhgns (though I think maxhgns has a broader sense of what can be philosophically valuable, the idea that overlap has to do with a certain sort of use seems to be present). I take the issue of overlap or relevance to be something more along the lines of: "Can we understand Heidegger in a way that his position can be articulated relative to contemporary work?" That relationship, if there is one, can be articulated a number of ways among which are: (1) Heidegger gives identifiable arguments for position X in the contemporary literature (2) Heidegger has a position distinct from any of the current positions in the contemporary literature, but is still identifiable in the terms of the debate (3) Heidegger rejects the terms of the debate in the literature but in a constructive way. 

 

The way Sellars, for instance, brings Kantian insights to bear on epistemic concerns is either in the sense of (2) or (3) [i'm pretty sure (3), but I'm not familiar enough with the terms of the debates at the time "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" was published]. In either case, there isn't going to be any perceivable 'use' to members of the debate prior to the relationship of the philosopher to the debate becoming clear. This is especially true in the case of (3). 

 

All of which isn't to say that metaphysicians should drop working on issues regarding plural quantification and read Heidegger (as a side note, I'm not especially attached to the idea that Heidegger is relevant to contemporary metaphysics, but I'm not ready to dismiss it), but that we shouldn't out of hand dismiss continental philosophy as being irrelevant just because we can't immediately see how we can make arguments with Heidegger for or against positions on plural quantification. Especially not as more and more people are doing work showing just how much continental philosophy does make contact with issues in contemporary analytic philosophy. I do think it's a bad idea to think of philosophical value purely in terms of argumentative use. It's often valuable to understand what we're taking for granted to end up with the debates we have and what novel ways we can approach it.

 

tl;dr I get being pragmatically dismissive of continental philosophy (you can't read everything, maybe it doesn't interest you) but I don't see the point or the need for being theoretically dismissive of continental philosophy (it's irrelevant; it's not rigorous; it's nonsense). Especially when there are plenty of intelligent people who not only find it interesting and valuable but, these days, there are plenty of intelligent people who are showing why it can be interesting and valuable to analytic philosophers.

Edited February 14, 2014 by Monadology

[dgswaim]

I'm a little surprised at how the issue of overlap is being approached in terms of usefulness. SHP framed it that way ("How could I make use of Heidegger in an argument for X") as did maxhgns. I take the issue of overlap or relevance to be something more along the lines of: "Can we understand Heidegger in a way that his position can be articulated relative to contemporary work. That relationship, if there is one, can be articulated a number of ways among which are: (1) Heidegger gives identifiable arguments for position X in the contemporary literature" (2) Heidegger has a position distinct from any of the current positions in the contemporary literature, but is still identifiable in the terms of the debate (3) Heidegger rejects the terms of the debate in the literature but in a constructive way. 

 

The way Sellars, for instance, brings Kantian insights to bear on epistemic concerns is either in the sense of (2) or (3) [i'm pretty sure (3), but I'm not familiar enough with the terms of the debates at the time "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" was published]. In either case, there isn't going to be any perceivable 'use' to members of the debate prior to the relationship of the philosopher to the debate becoming clear. This is especially true in the case of (3). 

 

All of which isn't to say that metaphysicians should drop working on issues regarding plural quantification and read Heidegger (as a side note, I'm not especially attached to the idea that Heidegger is relevant to contemporary metaphysics, but I'm not ready to dismiss it), but that we shouldn't out of hand dismiss continental philosophy as being irrelevant just because we can't immediately see how we, for example, can make arguments with Heidegger for or against positions on plural quantification. Especially not as more and more people are doing work showing just how much continental philosophy does make contact with issues in contemporary analytic philosophy. I do think it's a bad idea to think of philosophical value purely in terms of argumentative use. It's often valuable to understand what we're taking for granted to end up with the debates we have and what novel ways we can approach it.

 

tl;dr I get being pragmatically dismissive of continental philosophy (you can't read everything, maybe it doesn't interest you) but I don't see the point or the need for being theoretically dismissive of continental philosophy (it's irrelevant; it's not rigorous; it's nonsense). Especially when there are plenty of intelligent people who not only find it interesting and valuable but, these days, there are plenty of intelligent people who are showing why it can be interesting and valuable to analytic philosophers.

I think this is basically correct. As a kind of anecdotal report, I can say that Heidegger, Ricouer, Levinas, Castoriadis, etc., are not typically included as the supporting material for my arguments in any formal sense, but I certainly read their work and find that it influences my approach to philosophy in general. Setting aside the pragmatic issues, I find that it makes little sense to bracket off and ignore such a large swath of philosophical scholarship if it is indeed one's aim to do philosophy in a serious way. I am no expert in continental thought, but I feel like I'd be kidding myself if I were to take up the position that reading it and drawing upon its conceptual repository is of no use. That just seems silly.

[dgswaim]

BTW, Monadology, Lee Braver is one of the people I have in mind that I'd like to study under pending admission to USF. Very thoughtful and careful philosopher.

[Monadology]

BTW, Monadology, Lee Braver is one of the people I have in mind that I'd like to study under pending admission to USF. Very thoughtful and careful philosopher.

 

Oh, neat! Last I checked he was at Hiram which didn't have a graduate program. I bet that would be a pretty exciting intellectual opportunity.

[gradcoffee]

[ianfaircloud]

[picture]

 

Is that a picture of you?  If so, that makes the post all the funnier.

[gradcoffee]

Is that a picture of you?  If so, that makes the post all the funnier.

Nope! It's from http://philosophershaming.tumblr.com/ (chanced upon this link in one of the other threads!)