what are your writing sample topics?

[overoverover]

My dream is MIT linguistics, which is combined with the philosophy department. 

'

Maybe I should get into the details of my honors thesis a little bit more. There's a phenomenon known as "breaking the fourth wall." I use sentences of that kind to reject every view that Millians come up with for fictional discourse.

 

I don't wanna get into the details here though, because I'm scared of plagiarism. :<

While their programs share a department, they operate pretty much independently. Very little interaction (or so I've been told by grad students there).

I wrote on that kind of stuff when I got into my current program. TBH, though, I don't think you need to worry about plagiarism—nobody who is publishing in real journals is looking through GradCafe forums for paper ideas. 

[aojfifjoaisjaiosdj]

While their programs share a department, they operate pretty much independently. Very little interaction (or so I've been told by grad students there).

I wrote on that kind of stuff when I got into my current program. TBH, though, I don't think you need to worry about plagiarism—nobody who is publishing in real journals is looking through GradCafe forums for paper ideas. 

 

Hmm, one of my profs graduated recently from there and he didn't have that impression.

 

Regardless, I go to a school which is much stronger in linguistics than in philosophy, so I probably have a much better chance in getting into a linguistics program. Though, by the time I graduate I'll have taken around 12 grad level philosophy classes compared to 4 linguistics ones.

 

I'm paranoid. I can PM a summary if you're interested though.

Edited August 22, 2014 by Chiki

[overoverover]

Hmm, one of my profs graduated recently from there and he didn't have that impression.

 

Regardless, I go to a school which is much stronger in linguistics than in philosophy, so I probably have a much better chance in getting into a linguistics program. Though, by the time I graduate I'll have taken around 12 grad level philosophy classes compared to 4 linguistics ones.

 

I'm paranoid. I can PM a summary if you're interested though.

 

 

I could be wrong. Limited sample size, and all. 

Feel free to PM if you'd like.

[bonus]

I think I might call mine "Yet Another Paper On Kantian Moral Worth and Overdetermination". It's slightly more focused than that right now (basically I'm picking a fight with Guyer), but who knows what the next couple months will bring.

[MorganFreemanlives]

i was interested in MIT for some time until i realized they started requiring GRE very recently. The other thing about MIT is that despite getting a very high ranking in metaphysics in general, what they call metaphysics is nothing resembling say, what the 19th century called systematic metaphysics.

 

dont get me wrong, analytic linguistically inclined metaphysics is fun too, but the juicy parts of metaphysics are both interdependent and lends itself to systematic schematization. it seems a lot of modern metaphysics is stepping in each others shoes without getting much above ground.   compare Spinoza's ethics with Russell's On denoting and you will see what i mean.

Edited August 22, 2014 by HegelHatingHegelian

[reixis]

My WS is an attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for realism about secondary qualities (the title is "The nature of the qualitative"). I was, at first, wary to use such an ambitious piece of writing, but my letter writers thought it was a good idea, so I'm going with it.

[jjb919]

My WS is an attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for realism about secondary qualities (the title is "The nature of the qualitative"). I was, at first, wary to use such an ambitious piece of writing, but my letter writers thought it was a good idea, so I'm going with it.

That sounds like a very interesting paper. Have at it!

[MorganFreemanlives]

My WS is an attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for realism about secondary qualities (the title is "The nature of the qualitative"). I was, at first, wary to use such an ambitious piece of writing, but my letter writers thought it was a good idea, so I'm going with it.

what is your response to berkeley?

[aojfifjoaisjaiosdj]

It depresses me that as far as I can see, including myself, there's only two people doing samples that keep up with the more recent developments in analytic philosophy (philosophy of language, possible worlds, formal semantics etc.).

Edited August 23, 2014 by Chiki

[reixis]

 

what is your response to berkeley?

 

I don't address Berkeley's argument in this paper, but the main ideia is that primary qualities and secondary qualities are primarily qualities and that qualities are real. I recognize there is a distinction between them, but I argue that this distinction holds at a non-fundamental level. So the ideia is to provide an account of how things in the world can allow for the kind of perceptual variability we experience. Basically, while Berkeley holds that things are essentially ideas and that their being is to be perceived, I am going for a realism that allows for variability to happen outside our minds.

 

It depresses me that as far as I can see, including myself, there's only two people doing samples that keep up with the more recent developments in analytic philosophy (philosophy of language, possible worlds, formal semantics etc.).

 

I'm not sure what you mean by "analytic philosophy", but my WS is on topics that have been recently considered a part of this tradtition (at least institutionally speaking). My discussions of qualities are based on recent discussions in philosophy of perception (disjunctivism, color primitivism, and color pluralism). Mark Kalderon and Michael Martin (not to mention recent works from Alex Byrne, Heather Logue and William Fish) both have been publishing in these topics recently. 

Edited August 23, 2014 by reixis

[Establishment]

It depresses me that as far as I can see, including myself, there's only two people doing samples that keep up with the more recent developments in analytic philosophy (philosophy of language, possible worlds, formal semantics etc.).

 

Yup. I've said it before, but it's a shame WhoGotIn has been dying, since they were a lot more analytic focused.

Edited August 23, 2014 by Establishment

[aojfifjoaisjaiosdj]

Yup. I've said it before, but it's a shame WhoGotIn has been dying, since they were a lot more analytic focused.

 

What's that? Is it that results website?

 

I'm not a big fan at all of history of philosophy tbh. I don't wanna offend anyone but I personally don't find it very fulfilling.

Edited August 23, 2014 by Chiki

[Establishment]

What's that? Is it that results website?

 

I'm not a big fan at all of history of philosophy tbh. I don't wanna offend anyone but I personally don't find it very fulfilling.

 

http://who-got-in.livejournal.com/

[MorganFreemanlives]

 

 

 

I don't address Berkeley's argument in this paper, but the main ideia is that primary qualities and secondary qualities are primarily qualities and that qualities are real. I recognize there is a distinction between them, but I argue that this distinction holds at a non-fundamental level. So the ideia is to provide an account of how things in the world can allow for the kind of perceptual variability we experience. Basically, while Berkeley holds that things are essentially ideas and that their being is to be perceived, I am going for a realism that allows for variability to happen outside our minds.

 

 

I'm not sure what you mean by "analytic philosophy", but my WS is on topics that have been recently considered a part of this tradtition (at least institutionally speaking). My discussions of qualities are based on recent discussions in philosophy of perception (disjunctivism, color primitivism, and color pluralism). Mark Kalderon and Michael Martin (not to mention recent works from Alex Byrne, Heather Logue and William Fish) both have been publishing in these topics recently. 

 

the proud bombastic idealist in me feels morally compelled to share this.

 

http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Appearance_and_Reality/Chapter_I    

 

if nothing else, it will be productive methinks to be exposed to the opposite being.

[aojfifjoaisjaiosdj]

http://who-got-in.livejournal.com/

 

It's deader than God. :<

[kant_get_in]

It depresses me that as far as I can see, including myself, there's only two people doing samples that keep up with the more recent developments in analytic philosophy (philosophy of language, possible worlds, formal semantics etc.).

 

I don't consider them my AOI, but I read a lot of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. I should also note that I consider contemporary ethics and political philosophy to be a kind of analytic philosophy. People who doubt this should take a look at some of the literature on the ideal/non-ideal distinction (e.g Cohen's "Facts and Principles", Miller's "Political Philosophy for Earthlings",etc.)

[aojfifjoaisjaiosdj]

I don't consider them my AOI, but I read a lot of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. I should also note that I consider contemporary ethics and political philosophy to be a kind of analytic philosophy. People who doubt this should take a look at some of the literature on the ideal/non-ideal distinction (e.g Cohen's "Facts and Principles", Miller's "Political Philosophy for Earthlings",etc.)

 

I don't disagree. What I'm talking about is like an analysis of a historical writer like Kant, Nietzsche, Hegel, Heidegger etc.

[reixis]

the proud bombastic idealist in me feels morally compelled to share this.

 

http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Appearance_and_Reality/Chapter_I    

 

if nothing else, it will be productive methinks to be exposed to the opposite being.

 

Thanks. I didn't know about this piece of reading. I'll certainly read it in the near future. Anyway, many recent works have focused on these issues. You might want to check out the following:

 

Mark Kalderon. (2011b). The multiply qualitative. In: Mind, 120: 239-62.

 

Mark Kalderon. (2013). Realism and perceptual appearances. Presented at the conference “Cook Wilson and the Rise of Oxford Realism”, Université de Liége, Belgium, January 12th. Available at: <https://www.academia.edu/2366114/Realism_and_Perceptual_Appearance>.

 

Kalderon, M. and Travis, C. (2013). Oxford realism. In: Beaney, M. (ed.).

 

Genone, J. (2014). Appearance and illusion. In: Mind.

 

 

There is also an interesting discussion about the subject in Cook Wilson’s Statement and inference. I believe that he was at Oxford at the same time that Bradley was.

Edited August 23, 2014 by reixis

[Infinite Zest]

It depresses me that as far as I can see, including myself, there's only two people doing samples that keep up with the more recent developments in analytic philosophy (philosophy of language, possible worlds, formal semantics etc.).

 

My writing sample's on recent analytic philosophy (2000s).

 

I'm also surprised that many people aren't writing on more contemporary topics.

[jjb919]

My writing sample is on a pretty contemporary topic in ethics, although granted it is not a topic that many analytic philosophers I know of have been interested in. It's not on a historical figure, and I draw on both continental and analytic thinkers. Although all things considered I would tend to put it more in the continental camp, I like to think it has a foot in both.

[dgswaim]

Based on a conversation in another thread, I'm considering something like the following: "Hegel as Non-Spooky, Non-Onto-Theological Metaphysician, and the Reasons Why This Interpretation Holds"

[NathanKellen]

My writing sample's on recent analytic philosophy (2000s).

 

I'm also surprised that many people aren't writing on more contemporary topics.

There was a discussion on another thread about the dangers of writing on "hot topics" (e.g. Street's Darwinian Dilemma). That might be part of the reason.

 

The other part is probably because, surprisingly enough, a lot of departments don't have many courses dealing with contemporary issues, and writing samples often come from your favourite courses.

[Infinite Zest]

There was a discussion on another thread about the dangers of writing on "hot topics" (e.g. Street's Darwinian Dilemma). That might be part of the reason.

 

The other part is probably because, surprisingly enough, a lot of departments don't have many courses dealing with contemporary issues, and writing samples often come from your favourite courses.

 

I agree with your second reason.

 

As for the first, I think a lot of people realize the danger of picking a "hot topic" only after they have a writing sample/polished paper completed. I doubt that many people would scrap a sample just because it's on a hot topic.

 

It is, of course, possible to pick a contemporary topic that isn't trite.

[aojfifjoaisjaiosdj]

What are the hot topics? I'm not applying to any philosophy programs but I can't help but be curious.

[overoverover]

What are the hot topics? I'm not applying to any philosophy programs but I can't help but be curious.

 

Some possibilities: grounding/fundamentality, evolutionary debunking arguments (like Street's dilemma), maybe knowledge-first epistemology.