Doing it

[thatsjustsemantics]

1 hour ago, Ulixes said:

Also, I'm less interested in a criterion for the subject matter of metaphysics than its specific way of reasoning. That is, I'm wondering what justifies us inferring from [what we take it to be to be x] to [what it is to be x]. (The brackets aren't anything special, just a grammatical way to pick out two different notions that we may uncarefully read as one notion.)

And I use 'wonder' in its proper philosophical sense to mean that I've already answered the question.

The explanatory value justifies the inference. There is criticism of the explanatory value, but the criticisms are not helpful because they may risk provoking semantic debates that do not illuminate the topic. Let's shy from generalities.

Take the truth-making principle. It states that the existence of objects is what makes ontological statements true. The corollary licensed by the principle is that objects are those things which make propositions true. According to this principle, objects are truth-makers, so what it is to be is taken to be the truth value of a proposition. Let's shy further from generalities: it's true that the Mona Lisa exists. The existence of the painting makes the proposition about its existence true. In turn, I might ask: what makes the painting Mona Lisa art? To respond to this question, I'll mirror the truth-making principle: the x, y, or z of some object is what makes a particular object art (you don't actually think I know what art is, do you?!). According to the foregoing "principle," objects that bear the characteristics x, y, or z are art.

This is a rough sketch of the inference, which I hope I captured in my explanation; why should we follow this inference? One suggestion is the explanatory value. It's just clear. The other suggestion is that there really isn't anything else to metaphysical realism except this, so the inference is necessary in order to do work that others might endorse when it comes to picturing our world. There's a correspondence between our conception of existence and the objections that fall under that conception, unless there are good reasons to reject this view. There usually is not.

At some point, when metaphysical realists gather around the dinner table after having escorted those who reject the existence of objects, there will be further disagreement over the diversity of objects. With a glass of red wine in hand, mereological nihilists state that there are only simples arranged according to a certain pattern that corresponds with our conception of an object. Raising their objections those who believe in composition think that composition is real and falls under the concept of 'object,' etc.

There's a lot to it.
 

Edited February 6, 2016 by thatsjustsemantics

[Ulixes]

Sounds good to me, but I'm going to put on my pragmatist hat (which I stole from MentalEngineer when he was away) and see if what you said still makes sense.

First, why accept the truth-making principle? It doesn't seem like objects make (whatever that means) propositions (if there are such things) true. What we think of as 'true' just is our satisfaction with the anthropocentric answers we've come up with to the anthropocentric questions we've asked ourselves. Whatever is 'really real' needn't come into the picture at all, and even if it did, there's no way of telling that it has.

Second, explanatory value is relative to the interests of whoever wants the explanation. There's no reason to think that metaphysical explanations do any sort of work unless one already thinks there are metaphysical truths to act as explanations. What's going on when we come up with an explanation is that we satisfy ourselves with an answer to some very limited, perspectival question. The 'truth' of that answer doesn't do the work in satisfying us, it's whatever use we can put the answer to that satisfies us.

At least, that's how I imagine someone less interested in sorcery would respond. I, for one, think deflated balloons make for shit parties.