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I think it might be different when they're talking about another prof to a student. I can see why, even when they're on a first-name basis with each other, that they would still use the title to indicate seniority as well as not assuming familiarity. Just a point about "colleagues". I'm not criticizing those institutional cultures where grad students and faculty are thought of as colleagues; it's usually an organic feature which I have no right to disparage. It is what it is. However, I personally smply don't accept the notion that we're colleagues in a general sense. As I think I said earlier, I consider my fellow grad students my colleagues, not the faculty. The term implies to me equivalent status, which is certainly not the case between grad students and faculty. We can be collaborators, co-authors, etc. But I'd have a hard time describing a prof as a colleague. BTW, I don't think 'colleague' indicates the same relationship as 'collegial'. A department and a student-faculty relationship can be perfectly collegial without the two being seen as 'colleagues'.

I certainly agree that it varies by school and even often by program, but as I said earlier, I personally would feel uneasy calling profs by their first names even if that were the prevailing institutional culture. If a prof insisted or strongly preferred it, I certainly would make that effort, but it would be just that: an effort. Perhaps my sense of deference and formality will change during my doctoral studies, I don't know.

We had a discussion about this a while ago: I still personally feel uncomfortable calling professors by their first name, though I've never had a prof who insisted I do so. It's funny you mention feeling like an undergrad, because, the way I see it, there's a nice humility to having deference for those of higher academic status. Grad students are still students. I don't feel like faculty members are my 'colleagues', my fellow grad students are. As I said in that thread, it may be in part a cultural thing.

Well, I'm not American, so I can't help out, but I certainly support the aim. I'm not too familiar with the system, though: is there not a separate federal funding agency for the Social Sciences? Up here, there's NSERC (Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council) and SSHRC (Social Sciences and Humanities...). In general, I think separating the two is a good thing, so if the aim is to divorce the Social Sciences from the NSF and into its own agency, I'd be for it. However, knowing who controls the House and where this idea of defunding social sciences likely comes from, I doubt that's the case.

If your professors were aware of your situation as expressed in this and your previous thread, I am positive, just as human beings, they would advise you to leave the program, IF that's what would help you free yourself from your mother. However, it's also not that surprising that they encourage you to stay; they're employees and spokespeople for what is essentially a business, not your personal counsellors. I didn't want to jump into this thread because 1) I don't currently 'have' a school, and 2) I think you've heard all you need to hear from us. But as far as the salary issue goes, I think I mentioned this in your other thread: why don't you just tell your mother to google 'average MFA salary' and go from there? There is a cure to her delusions: facts.

I have no idea what it's like to work in a lab, so forgive my possible naivete, but I would tend to agree with those who advise to challenge him on these issues in a polite but direct way. If what he's doing is actively diminishing the work of the group, I'd suggest it's even to his benefit that he knows about it. Again, perhaps I'm naive, but you have standing in your own right; you are a grad student and were assigned/chosen for that group. You have reasonable expectations, and even the responsibility, to do what you can to make the group work at its best. Being 'in control' doesn't have to mean 'controlling'.

hey theSquirrel, just curious, are you describing Concordia? I did my MA at McGill, but I took one course at Concordia, so I knew a few grad students there. This was a few years ago, though. Interesting to hear about how Concordia's program works, if that is indeed where you are.

So, I'm still searching for apartments. I don't think I can really settle on something until I get there in person. I'm trying to keep my options open, though, so if any of the posters from London are still around, I have a couple questions about 'Richmond Row'. What exactly is it that makes it undesirable? Is it just noise? If it is, do you think it would largely be mitigated by some distance, like if it were one block over from Richmond? I lived in the McGill ghetto first year of my MA, and I honestly didn't mind it, despite my being the furthest thing from a 'partier' as one can get, probably. I can handle noise. Also, what would be your guess of the boundaries of the 'problem' section of the street? Looking at the Richmond Row association site, they seem to label it as between Oxford and Queens. Does that seem right? I know someone above said the whole length should be avoided, but I was looking at a couple places around St. Joseph's Hospital, and it seems from afar to be a quiet area. Are my impressions accurate?

OK, let me just clarify from my end. Obviously, there's variation in course structure, between and within fields. So there won't be a simple answer to this question. Where I TAed, and where I did my undergrad, it was always the case that large courses were divided into two basic parts: the lecture and the small group session (called tutorials, sections, conferences, etc.). The prof would, of course, be in charge of the lecture and overall course management, while the TAs led the small group sessions. So, each TA would lead 2-4 of these, 4 being considered a 'full' TAship. In a class of 300 students, say, there would be 5 or more TAs, and these would be both MA and PhD students. So, the TAs had the same responsibilities: leading the small group sessions, and grading papers and exams. Now, as I said earlier, individual TAs would choose, within the limits of the course, how to lead their sessions. Some would 'teach' a little more than others, such as giving a short lecture of their own, while others, like myself, would tend to allow as much student discussion as possible, as long as it was on topic. As far as I can tell, this variation wasn't between MA and PhD, but simply individual style. A different thing altogether is graduate students who are the sole instructors of a class. This is what I equate with the term 'teaching a class', and is, I think, almost always reserved for PhD students, usually by special application, i.e., it's not necessarily part of the funding package and is not a strict requirement of the program. This is all in a social science at two Canadian universities.

Welcome to the forums! As far as I know, at the schools I've been to, there is no difference between being a TA as an MA or PhD student, in terms of the concrete job responsibilities. Both 'kinds' of grad students are often assigned to the same course, so the duties would be the same, though sometimes there will be a 'Head TA' position which carries a little bit of extra responsibility. There may very well be qualitative differences, though, in the way you present yourself, the way students and colleagues see you, and how you choose to run your sessions within the leeway of the course.

Wow, what a way to irrelevantly and obnoxiously bring Nietzsche into this. At first, I thought this was a sincere request for info, but your subsequent responses show otherwise.

Uhh... Why the concern about not majoring in a "hard science" when you're not applying to graduate programs in them? I'd think your major in philosophy would be exactly the background for humanities grad programs of the kind you're looking at: religious studies, philosophy, classics. It's not even like the social sciences, where a quantitative background would certainly help. Please enlighten me if I'm missing something here.

I'm not sure why your posts keep getting voted down; there's nothing objectionable in them. But that's another matter. The first point: that's up to the observer. In many cases, he won't even want to 'fully understand' in the sense I think you mean. In my field and in other social sciences, there are 'large-N' and 'small-N' studies. The former takes a large number of observations and tests a particular hypothesis through the use of statistical methods such as regression. 'Small-N' case studies try to examine in close detail only a few cases, looking for the actual causal mechanisms. To an observer who is examining this question of determinants of graduate admissions success, he can do either, or preferably, both. As far as the religious affiliation example, I'm not sure what you mean by 'doesn't really work'. It's about as typical an empirical result in a whole field of political science, 'political behaviour', as any. What do you mean by coincidence? The point of a regression model, as with other statistics, is to minimize the probability that the results would occur by chance. When they report opinion polls, as you probably know, they say something like "the results are accurate plus or minus 3 percent, 19 times out of 20". Similar thing. Believe me, I'm not trying to belittle you, but perhaps you could at least look into basic statistics and simple linear regression, which isn't all that difficult to learn. I'm not a quantitative whiz either, that's for sure. You may indeed be right that a model which seems to apply well to one situation will not in another. That happens all the time. If that's considered a problem, then it's with the model. As I said, the proof of the success of a model depends on what the modeller wants to do with it and whether colleagues are convinced or persuaded by its validity and usefulness. It's not a matter of coming up with a 'cookie cutter formula' and pronouncing that it solves all problems; it's more that one constructs a model, tests hypotheses with it, writes up the results, and gets feedback. It's a dialogue. The second point: I absolutely agree that applicants needn't and oughtn't to spend their time coming up with a statistical model of the admissions process, unless, perhaps, that actually happens to be their research interest and they're applying in a suitable field (wouldn't that be an interesting writing sample?). This would be something that professional academics would do, for curiosity's sake, perhaps with real-world implications. I think the data-gathering for such a study would be one of the more difficult aspects, but it's certainly possible.

I think this is a simple case of disagreement about the value of quantitative methods of inquiry. It's quite clear, though not in so many words, that ZeeMore simply does not believe that any regression model could capture the complexity of the admissions process enough to have any degree of predictive power. Behavioral has a much greater faith in quantitative measures, which is unsurprising given his background. Although I am generally a qualitative person in an increasingly quantitative field (political science), I do think that regression models can be tremendously helpful, and in the case of graduate admissions, I'm inclined to think a good model can be constructed (perhaps already has), which will give statistically significant and meaningful results. ZeeMore, when you talk about various things which can't be 'covered within a formula', you'd be surprised. Anything can be measured and quantified. There are, of course, all sorts of validity issues which are the stuff of endless argument in the social sciences, but, as they say, the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Quantitative models just are; they're neither good nor bad. It's up to the author to construct models which would be convincing to their colleagues. I think you're overstating the arbitrary and individualized nature of the admissions process just a bit. You're right that, in the actual decisions process, each application is considered individually. That doesn't mean that, in the aggregate, patterns don't or won't show up. Surely, the admissions process isn't that chaotic. A regression model in political science, for example, might show that region and religious affiliation are heavily correlated with vote choice, which tells us something interesting and prompts further, perhaps qualitative, research. But that doesn't mean that any particular individual, say, a born-again Christian from Alberta (if you're Canadian, you'll know what I'm talking about), can't 'buck the trend', as it were. Statistical methods are about overall, aggregate patterns, probabilities, and likelihoods. I don't see that graduate admissions, in any discipline, would be wholly immune from such measurements. And just to repeat his own defense, Behavioral isn't saying that admissions committees actually make decisions using formulas or regression models. In the first instance, he was simply outlining a theory from economics which might explanatorily capture the specific case of MA to PhD, etc. His point is that regression models might be used by an outside observer to analyze patterns in graduate admissions. In addition, it has nothing to do with field, except, perhaps, in so far as some fields rely on explicitly quantitative measures (GPA, GRE, LSAT) more than others, which may mean regression models which are more convincing. In this, I don't think there's a strict sciences/humanities divide; I've been told that the GRE is very important in philosophy, for instance, as is the LSAT to law school, while the somewhat vague notion of 'research experience' in the sciences isn't explicitly amenable to measurement.

No need to apologize. I probably just overstated in that last post, as when I said 'training' I didn't mean I was a professional philosopher or something. I did an 'extended minor' in philosophy, which is probably about the same amount of philosophy you've done, and I did TA a political philosophy course. That's it, though. I've been through my fair share of heated political discussions, and I'm usually in the middle because I'm naturally cautious and inclined to follow 'principles of charity': imputing sincere motivations and intentions, and trying to think the best of the discussants. Thus, I don't want to say anything about Aaron personally; I'm absolutely sure that he's not indifferent and uncaring about violence and death. I'm sure he cares as much about such things as we all do. He simply has different views about how to deal with such things, and how to balance those risks against his views about basic rights and liberties. Now, obviously, we disagree with him both empirically and in terms of that normative balance of values, but I truly believe he is well-meaning. To be sure, as you say, he hasn't been particularly charitable towards those who disagree with him, but that's his burden.

Wow, this really blew up, didn't it? I doubt a 'formally-trained philosopher', to quote something earlier, would change much. I've tried in all my comments to provide carefully expressed thoughts; I have some training in philosophy and, as the box to the left shows, I'm in political science. I quoted, at length, some findings from a scholarly work whose author, by the way, candidly admits he is a member of both the NRA and the Brady Center for Gun Control and, reading through it, seems thoroughly fair-minded and analytically rigorous. At this point, the discussion is really basically just three users repeating again and again their arguments, and each talking over each other's heads, because we're coming from such different and diametrically opposed fundamental premises. As I said earlier, it's probably of no use to try to convince anyone of the ultra-libertarian position, as Aaron clearly is, that any restrictions whatsoever on individual liberty, as they conceive it, are justifiable. It's clear by the derogatory, slightly mocking way that Aaron talks about various societal institutions such as government, the police, indeed, even 'society' itself, that he is skeptical, to put it mildly, of the legitimacy of many, if not most, aspects of our political and social systems. That's fine. I repeat that this is a perfectly legitimate philosophical viewpoint, but it's just not something which can really be contested. I'd humbly suggest we all save our breathes and agree to disagree. Or you can carry on. Obviously it's up to you, but the discussion seems quite futile at this point.

Alright, so I'm back in. Just to briefly comment on the whole discussion around Aaron's views, as I said in a previous post, philosophical libertarianism is a legitimate, consistent viewpoint; I don't think to call it 'sick and disgusting' does anyone justice. Aaron clearly was not intending to denigrate homosexuality or liken it to gun ownership other than for the purposes of supporting his view that individuals of any kind should be free from coercive interference in their right to carry on their own business. I can accept his good faith. Obviously, I don't accept the argument, for many reasons, including that gun ownership is a choice and that, as I said in my earlier post, nobody to my knowledge has shown, or could show, I think, that homosexuality does any appreciable harm to society, other than to some people's moral sensibilities, while it's indisputable that the proliferation of gun ownership and use is significantly correlated with higher rates of homicide and violence. Whether the latter point outweighs whatever 'rights' individuals do have to carry guns is a value judgement; I think it does, while Aaron clearly does not. As for the above reply, I'm sorry, but that's plainly absurd. Are you really arguing that the police are basically glorified journalists? What, pray tell, is the purpose of 9-1-1? I'm from Vancouver. The police patrolling the riot weren't 'taking accounts'. The value of a police force is both in its everyday duty of law enforcement and its deterrent purposes. Your second point, while you're legitimately entitled to believe so, seems to me clearly wrong. I do rely on police to keep me safe. I rely on government to make public policy which creates safer, more peaceful societies. I rely on neighbours and friends. Your argument is more suited to life in the hypothetical 'state of nature' of Locke, or more pointedly, Hobbes, than anything resembling modern, prosperous, ordered societies. It's precisely in such a 'state of nature' that life is more insecure and more subject to chance and fate, since, every individual being his own enforcer of law, his own judge, jury, and executioner, every individual is subject to the arbitrary and capricious whims of every other individual. Can you really tell me sincerely that there isn't a greater element of 'chance' in a totally armed society as opposed to a gun-free one? As for the whole notion of self-defense. At first, it seems intuitively right. After all, it's pretty self-evident that a gun is a deterrent to a would-be criminal, right? They pull a gun on you, you whip out your blazing pistol and they run away in fear, or better, you shoot them, non-fatally over course. Obviously, it would never be the case that, having seen your gun, they would shoot you first. All sarcasm aside, Spitzer, in the book I mentioned I'm reading, concludes his chapter on the 'Criminological Consequences of Guns', the following, in part: I quote this because it renders many of my arguments in a clear and compelling way. Now, you can feel free to disagree with any of the assertions, though I'd suggest you have evidence to support your claims. If you're of Aaron's mindset, of course, none of these considerations are salient because the right to be let alone outweighs whatever societal effects a particular manifestation of that right engenders. I can accept that. I understand that some people simply have a 'live free or die' attitude, as it were. But if we're arguing about the empirical question over whether the presence and use of guns is causally related to a society with more homicides and violence, the answer is clear, at least to me. I think I made this point earlier, but let me reiterate: it's not, fundamentally, about my 'fear' or 'discomfort' around guns, and others' familiarity and comfort with them. That point is certainly important to many of the discussions going on here, but, as I said, public policy isn't and shouldn't be individualized. It's about choices, and their likely aggregate effects, with reference to a particular end. To me, it follows from the evidence that the societal benefits of restrictions on gun ownership and use are greater than whatever costs such restrictions might impose, but obviously some see the costs quite differently than I do.

I don't think that's true, at least going by the rarity of schools which actually offer stand-alone MA programs. I don't believe any of the eight PhD programs I applied to in the US had an MA program, and I'm certain that most of the other top 50 schools do not.

Yeah, I think you'll have to get clarification from your school, since that sentence is so convoluted, especially out of context, that I don't think anybody here will be able to parse the meaning. I have no idea what "registered as a graduate" means, unless it means registered to graduate after completing the term. Or else it's using 'graduate' as short for the status of 'having graduated', but then I don't really consider someone already graduated as still 'registered'. So, it seems to say that, for instance, if you're 'registered as a graduate' for fall 2011 (graduating after completion of that term), and had applied for graduation during summer 2011 (or spring, whatever the term prior to Fall), that you must drop the summer 2011 courses (or Fall 2011?) and apply to graduate later than Fall 2011. Which makes absolutely no sense to me.

Explanation for the norm or for the preponderance of people on this site? The former, I don't know, except to say at least a part of it is probably historical/institutional inertia. The latter, well, most people here are American and/or are applying to US universities. I would dispute your second point a little. As far as I know, in my field, a Master's is a prerequisite for admission to a PhD program for domestic (Canadian) students. If there is a 'direct entry' option, it's for exceptional, outstanding cases, usually requiring an honours degree. I'm pretty sure the MA requirement is similar for many, if not most, of the social sciences and humanities.

Alright... just when I thought I was out, they pull me back in... In terms of the 'fear' of guns, I will freely admit that I would not be comfortable in their presence. Actually, I have never even seen a gun in person, outside of decorative or museum pieces, which perhaps attests to the regime up here as well as my personal experiences. But the point isn't about an 'irrational fear' of guns. Going with what zeemore and two espressos said, if Aaron or other gun proponents can show that homosexuality does the same amount of societal damage that guns do, I'd be the first to consider seriously restrictions on it. Of course, though, that claim would be egregiously false. Opposing guns in general, and supporting specific efforts to restrict their proliferation and use, is a legitimate, though obviously not universally shared, response to the harm guns do to society.

Well, I said I wasn't going to comment further, but I just have to reply to Aaron McDevitt's various replies. They all seem to basically boil down to a version of extreme individualistic libertarianism. It's a legitimate viewpoint, but it's also very difficult to have discourse with, since it takes a reasonable principle, that individuals have a basic right to negative liberty, to be 'let alone', as it were, to its solipsistic extreme. It has one simple answer to every question of public policy. If the only role of government is to allow for maximally 'free' individuals, besides basic functions of law and order, than any appeals to what's good or better for society, what responsibilities the state has to pursue the common good, any actual empirical evidence which shows that some particular aspect of society does appreciable harm, are for nought, if the related policy options hinder at all the 'right' of an individual to be wholly free, autonomous and self-regarding. As I said, it's a legitimate philosophical viewpoint, but it's 1) not particularly conducive to argument, and 2) not instantiated in the real world and probably cannot be, notwithstanding the hopes of Ayn Rand and Ron Paul followers.

That's a good, albeit extreme, example of my concerns about guns on campus. Now, obviously, that's a situation where, in one of the discussant's terms, it went from a 'peaceful action' to not, but I can think of several hypothetical examples where there can be subtle intimidation and threats without any overt action. A student, say, brings a gun to campus and puts it in front of him on the desk. Or comes to a prof's office and makes it clear that he's carrying, but not in any explicit manner. Speaking personally, a policy of allowing guns on campus would be a huge obstacle to me as a potential faculty member or grad student, and I imagine it would be for many others. I certainly would not be comfortable as a TA or lecturer in that kind of environment. Now, this thread shows plainly that for many it wouldn't be a problem, but I think the potential effects on hiring/recruiting would at least be among the considerations a university would look at. As for the discussion, I've said pretty much all I wanted to say, and I really ought not to spend so much time on lengthy replies when I should be doing more 'productive' things This has made me think about the issue a lot more than I have, though, to the point where I've got into a book on the public policy and politics of gun control (specifically, this one), and I may bring some of those points in. But hopefully others will continue the excellent discussion we've been having.

Yeah, I'd think and hope that academic freedom, and free speech in general, would prevent any negative legal or academic consequences simply because you express an opinion. However, I don't think there would be anything improper, necessarily, in a potential employer or colleague, having seen the videos, thinking more or less of you because of the reasoning and manner of argument therein. If you're confident that you're coming across as an intelligent, reasonable person, and would and could stand behind your comments in person, you should be fine.

Great points; I agree with all of them. The only thing I'd add involves #5. You'll want to be careful about this. At least where and when I TAed, it wasn't our direct responsibility to enforce academic honesty. If we suspected it, we would refer it to the prof, who would deal with it.