Swagato

No idea, to be honest. Perhaps UCSB is sending out rejections first. Or maybe they're doing it as they go. You're applying to GW for film?

Received my first news of this cycle, and it was a rejection. Granted it was one of my earliest applications (and thus, did not have my strongest writing sample OR SOP), but I do wish the season could've started out otherwise! However, a dozen left to go, and all I really need is one. This is for film studies, so you English chaps can relax. I just post here often since it's a livelier thread.

UC-Santa Barbara notified me of a denial. I'm not too torn up over it as I'm aware my earliest applications (Dec. 1) were not at all my strongest. Still, more than a dozen to hear back from now.

The three Ivies I applied to have deadlines of Dec. 15th and Jan 2. I don't expect to hear anything until mid-February at the earliest.

Force myself to read a minimum number of pages of the books I'm reading, each day. Since I have to understand to my satisfaction whatever I'm reading, this means that if, in distraction, I skim pages I inevitably have to go and re-read them. So it goes.

I'd be very interested in reading their response later on, as promised. This comment by rems is one that really resonates with me: "Can you give me an example of an "empirically" determined truth in literature (that's not a date or fact)?" For some years, certain figures within film and visual studies pursued and pushed a cognitivist approach that claimed to move away from High Theory while, ironically, promoting its own version of High Theory. Many acknowledged the new information made available to us through these cognitive approaches, but ultimately, the fact remains that no amount of neuro-babble will deliver up a formula for the perfect film, or the perfect horror film, or the perfect comedy film, etc. Likewise, I do not see science in general ever overthrowing or 'defeating' the humanities by laying bare the "secret" of why, or how, a work like In Search of Lost Time produces the kind of affect that it does. I welcome the kind of analytical information scientific methods can offer, but I see them as holding little further potential than that.

My own participation has increased lately primarily because I'm trying to get through the limbo period before my notification-time-period begins. Which is soon. @_@

Before I say anything further, let me just say that I'm really enjoying this spirited discussion, and I hope each of us can continue and develop these within the context of a PhD program. Two Espressos, we have obvious differences, yet the give-and-take going on here is something I, at least, am really enjoying. From what I've read so far, your animosity toward Freudian psychoanalysis seems to be bundled up with a larger grouping of work within the humanities that you perceive as obscurantist/built on shaky reasoning/simply obsolete. I agree with the latter in some respects. I'm not terribly fond of Zizek, reading Butler is often more difficult than it needs to be, the same can be said of Bhabha, and so on. However, what I'm arguing is that Freud is not to be tossed into this group, mostly for the reasons I already mentioned earlier. What I cannot understand is your almost absolutist insistence on "falsifiable, empirical studies." You also say that our "job is both to discover truths and study them critically." I thought we were long past this rather hubristic (and very Enlightenment-era) notion of "discovering truths"! Surely after Adorno and Horkheimer, and Foucault (to name just a few), the era of humanistic pursuit of "truths" as though they wander the wilds of civilisation waiting to be discovered is over? You claim that humanists are pretending to access "knowledge about psychological phenomena...through Freud, et al." Some do/have done, certainly. But there are also many, many others (and this is the group I'm a fan of) who have successfully navigated a path between aspects of Freudian thought that are clearly in error, and aspects of Freudian thought that in many ways offer philosophical understandings of...well, a whole lot of things across the humanities. I cited a few examples earlier (Lippit's work, Lear's work, the continuing relevance of the Mystic Writing Pad), but also consider things like Derrida's "Freud and the Scene of Writing," etc. It is not for no reason that nearly all of the 20th and 21st centuries' most prominent thinkers across fields have, at some point or other, confronted Freud in their work. "Categorizing and analyzing knowledge and ideas is exactly what we should be doing as humanists." I disagree most emphatically. The time for categories and disciplinary stakes is long, long past. My own field is perhaps the best example. As film increasingly insisted on its own critical studies, humanists fought to establish it as a discipline unto itself (film studies, that is). This took most of the early 20th century. Among the principal criteria used was the famed indexical rhetoric of the film (photographic) image, that is, the logic of the trace. The photograph inevitably is an index of something that occurred in time, something that was there (Barthes deals with this in Camera Lucida). And just as film studies finally became among the hottest fields in the humanities, everything fell apart. The emergence of the digital image all but wrecked one of the core founding criteria of the field. Today, film studies is increasingly conversing with art history as we are (re-)framing film and the moving image arts within a much longer historical tradition of projection, movement, and time-based imagery. Categories were set up, and are now being broken down. This does not risk exploding the essence of film studies as a field; it simply redefines the stakes. If anything, the kind of compartmentalisation you desire strikes me as very reminiscent of Taylorisation, of commodification, and ultimately of corporatising academia. You may see it as good practice, but I ask: according to whom? It seems to me that only a market that predicates itself upon commodification would approve of narrowly categorised (pigeon-holed) fields. You say that it is not self-evident that the work of the humanities is to interpret the data churned out by science. This is a good point, and has given me something to think about. I think it is justifiable to ask that the humanities demonstrate its claim to the work of interpretation. I don't have an answer for this right away. However, if you're referring to Alex Rosenberg, then that definitely explains our differences. I think Rosenberg is a science-fetishist, and his constant harping on "neuro-___" is nigh-unbearable. I really cannot abide those who jump at the lure of whatever offers some perceived "validation" to other eyes--in our times, this means tagging "neuro-" onto whatever and calling it a day. I also must disagree emphatically with the idea that the humanities are dying. Yes, the various pressures you named are all part of why they are denigrated, but considering that (again, relevant to my field) the last 2-3 decades have seen the output of a couple of books (Jonathan Crary's Techniques of the Observer and Martin Jay's Downcast Eyes) that have fundamentally affected ideas of historical vision, visuality, visual culture, and indeed the stakes of visual perception itself, and considering that neither of these needed to rely on empirical "evidence," I'm more than confident that this era, too, shall pass. By which I mean, again, the ongoing fetishisation of science and data. Yes, we live in a data-driven age. Of course it seems that data is indispensable. By the way, do read Crary's book. It is 150 pages or so, and is a near-perfect example of how the humanities can do the work of "interpreting" scientific razzle-dazzle.

Well, first of all, we don't agree that Freudian psychoanalysis "fails miserably" (as a methodology in human psychology). The thing about Freud is that his work is as much philosophy as it is "psychoanalysis." I definitely believe in psychoanalysis as a methodology to uncover layers of thought. Let me try to make this clearer. Freudian thought offers, to me, an extremely powerful deconstructive approach--one later developed through Lacan, Derrida, et al.--and finds its applications across the humanities. I cannot speak to psychology, but I want to say, based on how I have seen Freudian thought utilised in my field (and in English, too) that I can certainly see Freudian approaches offer real inroads to human psychology. If neuroscience and MRI scans tell us 'what' is happening, then Freud for me tells us why that what is happening. Now, to your points: I do not agree with these distinctions of "science" and "humanities," period. Both, for me, are approaches to knowledge. Neither trumps the other. Freudian thought is certainly no more bunk science for me than are the hypotheses or theories of any intellectuals over history who have had parts of their work overturned via subsequent discoveries. By "real empirical psychological studies," my impression is that you are basically referring to the kind of work cognitivists have done (in film/visual studies) or, say, some of the interesting studies that have been done via neuroscientific approaches--hooking up a spectator to an MRI during a screening, or tracking their eye movements, etc. These are certainly interesting and they tell us some 'whats' of the intricate exchange that occurs during an average film viewing, but I don't see that they go beyond that. I don't see any reason why these should overturn what doesn't need to be overturned (given its continuing applicability), but they can certainly supplement Freudian thought. I am not at all confident in claiming that Freudian thought has definitively been proven to be completely irrelevant in matters of the human body and mind (what is mind?). Again, this returns to #1. I have (as, I'm sure, do most of us) much, much more to learn about Freud and his standing in current humanistic thought, but I will not claim that "science" has established that his work is irrelevant to matters of psyche, consciousness, embodiment, and what have you. "...how is it epistemologically tenable to take ideas from a completely different field and somehow apply those ideas to a critical object?" Isn't that what interdisciplinarity calls for? The ability to successfully adapt the ideas, processes, perhaps even methodologies, of a field and interrogate the objects of another field? Yes, my comments about empiricism and scientism were directed to what, in your earlier post, I perceived as a near-fetishising reverence for the data-driven nature of modern science. We disagree over your claim that empiricism and "science" (I would point out that science is not a monolithic concept) is "the best and perhaps only way to learn about the physical world"--largely because I'm not a fan of Cartesian thought in this regard. Freud's "irrelevance" to modern psychology is largely a function of psychology itself seeking to bow down at the altar of data-driven scientism. Data is not the end of everything. Data needs digestion, it needs interpretation. Scientific practices may suffice to tell us what's going on, but ultimately it is the work of the humanities to make sense of it. And in that sense, Freud is alive and well.

Since I'm not presently in some kind of formal academic program, I'm mostly continuing to read various articles that feed into my major interests. Plenty of emergent work on screens and space, media archaeology, speculative realism/new materialism, but also working through Eivind Røssaak's Between Stillness and Motion and Stanley Cavell's Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory.

That's exactly why. If you cannot put out a mission statement of sorts within a highly compressed frame, it doesn't say much for your potential for future grant applications, journal (abstract) submissions, etc. The dissertation is, ideally, not a bloated mess but rather a compressed form of that future first book. My feeling is that the word limit on SOPs serves both the cause of convenience (600+ applications...) and of a litmus test in this regard.

I would like to disagree with the Freud-bashing going on here. Let me clarify. I am, of course, approaching this principally from the perspective of film (and visual) studies. Psychoanalytic theory was a major area within film studies for quite some time, but I do not necessarily subscribe to those ideas. At the same time, film has always been in a privileged position when it comes to representing, enacting, setting up, or manipulating psychological processes on screen. And indeed not just on screen, but even extending this play beyond the screen. Two quick examples can suffice. On the one hand, there is the notion of suture, wherein the spectator's gaze is "sutured" into the film-world, the camera-eye becoming the spectatorial (voyeuristic) eye. On the other hand, there are moments when the so-called fourth wall is broken, either explicitly or implicitly, and the film-world suddenly throws back its (normatively hidden) awareness of the "real" (i.e. spectatorial) world back at the audience. What is interesting about Freud is not so much his explicitly psychological/psychoanalytical work, but rather the ways in which philosophy can reclaim Freud. Consider Akira Lippit's amazing work in Atomic Light (Shadow Optics) where he develops a novel account of the relations between inscription/legibility, the body, and the impact of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on (primarily) the cinema of post-Hiroshima Japan. But also, he is able to develop a concept that he calls "avisuality," or a visuality that attempts to envision an invisible subject (read that again). Freud in this account is enormously useful, particularly in the ways that Lippit is able to wrest away from his psychoanalysis the work of philosophy. That is not to say the two are divorced; of course one is rooted in the other. Alternately, consider the work of Jonathan Lear (Chicago). He has done some of the most important work in showing how Freudian thought, far from being "overthrown" by an often-fetishistic scientism and over-emphasis on empiricism and falsifiability, remains crucial to philosophy today. And not just philosophy, considering the way in which fields like English, Comp Lit, Film Studies, Art History--essentially all of the humanities--have entered into exchanges with various aspects of philosophy. There are many more examples. But in short, while we can certainly criticise many of Freud's more outré hypotheses on the grounds that advances in neuroscience and medical science have shown them to be in error, we can definitely not afford to dismiss Freud in general. I'll close with one last example, one that is central to my own interests and provided one of the "Oh, wow" moments that I think we've all experienced. Freud's Mystic Writing Pad. It's a story, an account, call it what you will, that is proving ever more essential to media studies, media archaeology, history of technology studies, as we transition from 20th century notions of inscription and recording, playback, archives, memory, (inter-)mediality, etc. to a 21st century mindset. I would go so far as to say that anyone working in media studies right now simply cannot afford to be ignorant of the Mystic Writing Pad and all the questions/thoughts it raises. Freud remains essential.

Nothing further so far, then? I've been watching the increasing trickle of humanities decisions going out on the results board.

As usual, this is a contentious topic. Last year, I contacted nobody. I didn't get in anywhere except for one waitlist. This year, I chose my targets with greater care, reached out to specific faculty members, and was happily surprised with the generosity of responses I received. Sure, not everyone replied, but *most* replied with responses that indicated they had actually bothered to read what I had to say and ask. I ended up having phone conversations with a few, and learned things that I later worked into my SOPs. I was told more than once that if such contact/conversations have occurred, then mention it in your SOP--I did so. I briefly indicated that my conversations with X, Y have been formative to my application, etc. Apparently it is often the case that such files are forwarded directly to that person, or, if such a file ends up in the final round, then it's a good opportunity to stand out from the rest, should X, Y be positively inclined toward you.

Fine. I am irretrievably inscribed within the text of my own writing. ;\ Anyway, question. Is it the case that faculty members do this internet searching? Or is that more the province of grad assistants aiding the process?

Meh, it isn't like I identified "that rotund halfling with one eye and green skin at Stanford". . . In any case, the reason I ask is to know if you have *any* idea regarding what's going on at Modern Thought & Lit.

That's a very welcome bit of news, nestwerk. Welcome and hope to see more updates from you.

Didn't you say you were at Stanford? @DontHate

Worse than a negative recommendation is the fabled 'form letter' that makes it all too clear, between the hyperbolic superlatives, that this is completely a letter written to get rid of a pestering student.

Last year, USC sent out an admit email on this date.

bluecheese: I'm definitely not *complaining* about the grading. It's just basically true that grading *is* tougher there, and I'm sure the same applies for several other places. What I was expressing was the hope that adcoms are aware of this and take such things into account. I'm sure they do, but then again, most of the debates we're having here are over issues adcoms undoubtedly have a way of resolving. That being said, of course it is true that a lot depends on the whims of various professors--this was true at Chicago too. And yes, all of this has little to do with actual graduate work, but rather a lot to do with getting accepted, it seems. waparys: I certainly hope so!

I didn't exactly imply that I'm the first applicant from Chicago in my field. I expressed my hopes that they are aware that Chicago's grades tend to be harder-earned in comparison to grades at most other places.

Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology; Picture Theory; What Do Pictures Want?

Incidentally, I didn't know that you could apply to different programs within the same university (Chicago, Brown). Massive respect if you were able to put adequately differing spins on your proposal to make it fit the different departments at the same institution.

Fair points, all. I increased my number of targets, as well, though nothing as drastic as your list (went from 10 last year to 14-15 this year). I guess I've made a gamble in that I've applied solely to departments that I *know* will give me a solid footing for the kind of TT career I want. In that sense I'm up against that <5% admit rate with no parachute. What's your general background?