Ulixes

Sounds good to me, but I'm going to put on my pragmatist hat (which I stole from MentalEngineer when he was away) and see if what you said still makes sense. First, why accept the truth-making principle? It doesn't seem like objects make (whatever that means) propositions (if there are such things) true. What we think of as 'true' just is our satisfaction with the anthropocentric answers we've come up with to the anthropocentric questions we've asked ourselves. Whatever is 'really real' needn't come into the picture at all, and even if it did, there's no way of telling that it has. Second, explanatory value is relative to the interests of whoever wants the explanation. There's no reason to think that metaphysical explanations do any sort of work unless one already thinks there are metaphysical truths to act as explanations. What's going on when we come up with an explanation is that we satisfy ourselves with an answer to some very limited, perspectival question. The 'truth' of that answer doesn't do the work in satisfying us, it's whatever use we can put the answer to that satisfies us. At least, that's how I imagine someone less interested in sorcery would respond. I, for one, think deflated balloons make for shit parties.

Also, I'm less interested in a criterion for the subject matter of metaphysics than its specific way of reasoning. That is, I'm wondering what justifies us inferring from [what we take it to be to be x] to [what it is to be x]. (The brackets aren't anything special, just a grammatical way to pick out two different notions that we may uncarefully read as one notion.) And I use 'wonder' in its proper philosophical sense to mean that I've already answered the question.

For the record, I got into metaphysics after reading Harry Potter... there has to be a possible world in which such things happen... (or I don't want to live anymore).

Wrong or right about what? The relation or what's 'really real'? If the former, then yes, but that's fine: I take, as default, there to be such a relation that makes the inference work. If the latter, what we infer about reality is open to counterexamples, arguments, and so forth, and enough evidence to the contrary blocks us from inferring about reality. That seems like a good picture of reality and our relation to it, and (I think) explains how we can have knowledge about what's real. This could be the realist/pragmatist drinking game; it'd be played like Spin the Bottle, but instead of becoming closer friends if the bottle lands on you, you'd have to argue your favorite realist/pragmtist position, with those not adequately defending their positions having to drink. Also, drink penalties for saying 'I don't know what x is' or 'surely, blah blah blah'.

I take it that everyone grants there's a relation. My point is that we don't need to specify what the relation before we make inferences about reality. I doubt we'll be able to get clearer on what the relation is, aside from taking it brutally. Also, you're looking in the wrong place for why the relation holds: better ask the religion forum.

It's obviously the stuff that makes the metaphysical version of IBE work. You know, goo. I contend that there is a relation between us and reality, which everyone should grant (so long as we're not getting too specific about the relation). Your position seems to be that we have no reason to think the relation between us and reality allows for knowledge about what's real. I reply: of course it does, we know loads about real stuff. For instance, I know that I'm sitting at a table typing to you, a friend across town also on a computer. I know that there are plants outside that use a combination of water (a real thing) and sunlight (another real thing) to become nourished. I know that if I cut my arm off, I won't be destroyed (look! a modal fact!). It doesn't follow that I know why I won't be destroyed, and it's metaphysics' job to sort that out in finer detail. Once it arrives at a plausible, well-defended answer, we can infer the truth of that answer. What best explains all this boring, everyday knowledge? A relation holding between us and reality. And why should we think that reality is as we think it is? Because we don't walk off cliffs.

To use this quote in support of what I said: I think 'making good sense of' is the metaphysical inference at play. Once we've made good sense of something using a metaphysical claim, we infer the truth of that claim; it's like IBE, but better because it comes with metaphysical goo.

'What it is to be x' and 'what we take it to be to be x' are, to my lights, nearly the same question; when we have an answer to the second, we infer an answer to the first. That, mixed with the healthy view that reality (or at least most of reality) doesn't depend on us, is how metaphysics works. (At any rate, that's all how it seems to work to me.) The real battle, then, seems to be over our relation to reality; can infer that reality is as we seem to think it is? I think so, and I think we're appropriately related to reality to allow for such an inference, but I don't have an argument for that. I'd gesture to everyday life and claim that our understanding of everyday things (including what it is for something to be this way or that) couldn't be had without that relation being in place.

I'm interested in what metaphysicians are taking themselves to be doing, and how they think they're doing it. I think (roughly) that we use certain faculties to make inferences about what there is (and how it is). A lot of people seem to think metaphysicians take themselves to be doing something else entirely--divination, perhaps, or tea leaf reading. More seriously, metaphysicians have been charged with being unable to say anything true about about 'deep' reality because there are insurmountable epistemological barriers between us and what's real (whatever that is). Some examples of metaphysical questions are: what is it to be a [insert whatever here--if in doubt, go with tables]? What must be the case, and what could be the case? And, how can we know what must or could be? Can the Tardis truly rewrite time? How do [insert whatever] persist through change? How do parts compose a whole? There are also a whole host of questions dealing with what I like to think of as applied metaphysics: philosophy of religion has a few of these questions (does God exist, and if so, what's its nature, e.g.).

We sit around and talk about what schools we're interested in, but we don't really discuss anything of philosophical interest. So, with so many pre-philosophers in one place, I thought I'd ask something. A friend of mine brought up an interesting question earlier today (he's on here too, so I hope he comes and puts in his two cents): what do metaphysicians take themselves to be doing? I think they/we take arguments, intuition, and so forth to be a guide to what's real. I'm not sure what else they/we are up to, but they (mostly we) have been accused of a whole host of sorcery.

There are surely countless days colocated with this one!

So, four acceptances reported for Duke, and one waitlist. They're probably arguing about who, out of the rest of us, they're just going to accept as an associate professor. At least, that's what I'm going to tell myself until the ground feels stable.

Also, Jac: thank you for putting so much effort into the admissions blog. I sincerely appreciate the predictions!

Come on Duke! Come on Berkeley! Hopefully 02/02/2016 will be a good day and not just another humdrum biddletum.

That would be great. It seems like a slow start to the week; Emory rejections came in, but not much else (I guess UIC, for those interested). I just want to hear back from a program, even if it's a rejection; I feel like I'm perpetually waiting for the whole process to start.

Every time you stop by the office I'm trying to shut out all the kerfuffling hullabaloo.

Thanks!

Right, so, before things get derailed: what was the 'all schools post'? I'm not sure if it was a different one than the NYU post, and I don't get what folks were saying about admissions committees being on gradcafe.

Hey! It took me a few seconds to figure out which of us you are; I think there's one or two others on here (at least one refreshing the results page every few minutes). I think on of our second year's still hovers around, too.

Calling bullshit on the NYU acceptance. Edit: About 20 minutes later from first seeing it, the acceptance is gone. I don't know if the original poster deleted it or someone else (they said a few choice words, so maybe it was taken down for that), but let it be recorded that there was potentially an NYU acceptance. I wouldn't put any stock in it, though. The comment was something angry about people not posting stats, and the stats that were attached were perfect GRE scores and a perfect GPA.

And, of course, philosophy of religion. I take it for granted that everyone loves philosophy of religion, so forget to mention it as a special interest.

Knew you were a modal realist deep down. To introduce myself: I like metaphysics and metaethics, and currently finishing an MA at the same place as MentalEngineer. I've applied to 16 schools, but I can never remember them all. I recognize some of your names from the 2014 season; so, hello!

Anyone know what's up with the WashU entry? I didn't get an email saying a decision would be out soon.

That's super smart.

Hah! What was the paper on?